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NATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW MOOT
COURT COMPETITION
BEST BRIEF 2017
Co-sponsored by the Lawyers' Committee for Cultural
Preservation, the National Cultural Heritage Law Moot Court
Competition is the only moot court competition in the world that
focuses exclusively on cultural heritage law issues.
The Competition provides students with the opportunity to
advocate in the nuanced landscape of cultural heritage, which
addresses our past and our identity, and which has frequently
become the subject of contentious legal debates and policies. This
dynamic and growing legal field deals with the issues that arise as
our society comes to appreciate the important symbolic, historical
and emotional role that cultural heritage plays in our lives. It
encompasses several disparate areas: protection of archaeological
sites; preservation of historic structures and the built environment;
preservation of and respect for both tangible and intangible
indigenous cultural heritage; the international market in art works
and antiquities; and recovery of stolen art works.
Topics covered by the Competition in past years include:
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act of State
Doctrine (2016); constitutional challenges to the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (2015); statutory interpretation questions
regarding the Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act (2014); the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act and the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment (2013); the constitutionality of the Theft of
Major Artwork Act, which was passed under the Commerce
Clause (2012); the Immunity from Seizure Act and the equitable
defense of laches (2011); and the mens rea requirement and
extraterritorial application of the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act (2010).
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Do similarly situated American Indian Groups deserve the
same religious freedom protections if both groups can
practice their religion with minimal harm to governmental
interests?
2. Under NAGPRA, is a bald eagle feather that is being used
for a religious ceremony sufficient to meet the "specific
ceremonial object" definition stated in § 3002 of
NAGPRA's statutory language?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Facts
Mr. Redwing is a member of the Niobrara Band ("Band"),
a state recognized Indian group.' Mr. Redwing resides on the
reservation of the DePaulia Indian Tribe ("Tribe"), a federally
recognized Indian tribe. On November 16, 2014, Mr. Redwing
discovered the remains of a bald eagle under a tree on his property.
Mr. Redwing, an adherent of an American Indian religion that
holds eagles sacred, took the eagle into his custody to protect it
from scavengers and natural forces. Mr. Redwing immediately
contacted the Tribe's Chair, and transported the eagle remains to
the Tribe's headquarters to be used in their traditional religious
ceremonies. The Band also performs traditional religious
ceremonies that requires eagle parts. In recognition of his actions,
and so his Band could carry out its religious ceremonies, the Chair
gave Mr. Redwing three of the eagle's feathers.
On November 21, 2014, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
("USFWS") discovered that Mr. Redwing possessed eagle feathers
without a permit as required by the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act ("BGEPA"). Despite the fact that Mr. Redwing is a
member of a state recognized band, he is not eligible to apply for a
permit because he is not a member of a federally recognized tribe.
The USFWS agents seized the feathers, and brought criminal
charges against Mr. Redwing in December of 2014.
1 Citations to the National Cultural Heritage Law Moot Court Competition
record are omitted. 2017 record available at
https://law.depaul.edu/about/centers-and-institutes/center-for-art-museum-
cultural-heritage-law/our-work/moot-court
competeition/Documents/201 7%20NCHLMCC%20Competition%20Problem.p
df
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Procedural History
In March 2015, Mr. Redwing was convicted on one count
of knowingly possessing bald eagle feathers without a permit. The
United States District Court for the Central District of DePaulia
sentenced Mr. Redwing to one month in prison and ordered him to
pay a $2,000 fine. Mr. Redwing appealed his conviction to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit. He
contended that the prohibition under BGEPA and its regulations
violates his religious freedom under the Religious and Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA"). Additionally, Mr. Redwing argued
that the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
("NAGPRA"), not BGEPA, governs this case. The Twelfth
Circuit Court affirmed the lower court's judgment that BGEPA
and its regulation do not violate RFRA. The Twelfth Circuit Court
also rejected the argument that NAGPRA governs this case.
Mr. Redwing filed a petition for writ of certiorari before
the United States Supreme Court. This Court granted petition on
November 18, 2016.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States District Court for the
Central District of DePaulia is reported at No. 16 X 145. The
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth
Circuit is reported at No. 16-1983.
JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2. This action arises under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act. 42 U.S.C. §§2000bb-bb4, 25 U.S.C. §§3001, et
seq.
[Vol. XXVIL 167
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is de novo because the law, not the
facts, is in dispute. See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt.
System, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Redwing, as an American Indian, holds sincere
religious beliefs that eagles are sacred. The government has
burdened Mr. Redwing's free exercise of religion without
sufficient legal justification. While the government has a
compelling interest in protecting endangered bald eagles, the
government does not have a compelling interest in promoting
relations with federally recognized tribes at the expense of
similarly situated American Indian groups. The restrictions placed
on Mr. Redwing's free exercise of religion is one the government
created almost thirty years after BGEPA was enacted. This
interpretation of BGEPA that excludes American Indians that
practice sincere religious beliefs is not a compelling interest under
RFRA.
Here, the government has failed to prove that it employed
the least restrictive means in protecting eagle populations because
an outright ban on possession of eagle parts is not necessary to
accomplish this interest. Furthermore, Mr. Redwing was not
engaged in any activities that would jeopardize bald eagle
populations. Therefore, the government has not employed the
least restrictive means that would justify violation of Mr.
Redwing's religious freedom. Even if this Court finds a
compelling interest in fulfilling responsibilities to federally
recognized tribes, the government has failed to show that increased
wait times are a sufficient justification to limit the least restrictive
means analysis.
2017] 179
13
Benon et al.: National Cultural Heritage Law Moot Court Competition Best Brief
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2019
180 DEPAUL JART, TECH & IP LA W
Mr. Redwing's rights were separately violated when the
specific sacred objects were removed from American Indian land
in violation of NAGPRA. Respondent may argue that because
bald eagle feathers are fungible, they do not qualify as sacred
objects. However, bald eagle feathers are specific sacred objects
under NAGPRA because the Congressional Record reveals that
"sacred objects" need not be irreplaceable. Furthermore, even if
this Court disagrees that Congressional intent is clear in this
instance, this Court has previously held that when faced with two
possible constructions of a statute, the statute should be liberally
construed in favor of American Indians.
ARGUMENT
I. BGEPA AND ITS REGULATIONS VIOLATE RFRA
BECAUSE ALTHOUGH THERE IS A COMPELLING
GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN PROTECTING BALD
AND GOLDEN EAGLE POPULATIONS, THE
REGULATIONS ARE NOT THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANS OF DOING SO.
The government cannot create laws which needlessly
prohibit the free exercise of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I.
Congress, in passing RFRA, carefully carved out limited
circumstances in which the government can burden individuals'
exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). The
government may impose this burden only if it "demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person 1) is in furtherance of a
compelling government interest; and 2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling government interest." Id.
Mr. Redwing has sincere religious beliefs that bald eagles
and their remains are sacred and play an important role in his
religious ceremonies. Thus, USFWS substantially burdened Mr.
Redwing's free exercise of religion when it confiscated the bald
[Vol. XXVII: 167
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eagle feathers. USFWS confiscated the feathers based on
authority granted by BGEPA, under which one may not "take,
possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter,
transport, export or import ... any bald eagle ... alive or dead, or
any [eagle] part . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (alteration in original).
In recognition of the fact that this law does burden free exercise of
religion, regulations under BGEPA were promulgated to include a
religious exception. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22. This exception to the
blanket ban grants permits for possession of eagle parts "only to
members of Indian entities recognized and eligible to receive
services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs listed
under [the publication of list of recognized tribes] engaged in
religious activities who satisfy all the issuance criteria of this
section." Id. (alteration in original). Despite his sincere religious
beliefs and his membership in a state recognized band, Mr.
Redwing is not eligible to apply for a permit under this exception.
Mr. Redwing and other members of state recognized
American Indian groups should not be excluded from the religious
exception under BGEPA and its regulations because they do not
meet RFRA's standard to justify burdening Mr. Redwing's free
exercise of religion. The government has suggested two
compelling reasons to justify burdening religion under BGEPA: 1)
protecting bald and golden eagle populations; and 2) protecting the
interests of federally recognized American Indian tribes. While
the government certainly has a compelling interest in protecting
eagle populations, it does not have a compelling interest in valuing
the religious freedom of one group at the expense of other similar
groups. Furthermore, the government has failed to consider other
less restrictive means of protecting eagle populations.
Additionally, even if the government does have a compelling
interest in favoring the religious freedom of federally recognized
tribes, BGEPA's limited religious exception is not the least
restrictive means of accomplishing this interest.
2017] 181
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A. The Government Does Not Have a Compelling
Interest in Furthering Relationships with Federally
Recognized American Indian Tribes.
Circuit courts have disagreed on whether the government
has a compelling interest in furthering relationships with federally
recognized tribes. Compare United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d
1274, 1277 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the government has this
compelling interest because the United States has a special
obligation to federally recognized tribes); with McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the government does not have this compelling
interest because Congress did not intend to only protect the
religious interests of federally recognized tribes). The conclusion
that the government has a special obligation to federally
recognized tribes is, however, unfounded. Without a justification
for special treatment, this court should adopt the approach taken by
the Fifth Circuit Court in McAllen Grace.
The facts of McAllen Grace are strikingly similar to the
instant case. In 2006, a group of individuals including Robert
Soto, a member of a state recognized American Indian tribe,
attended a religious ceremony while in possession of eagle
feathers. McAllen Grace, 764 F.3d at 468. USFWS attended the
religious ceremony and confiscated the feathers because the
individuals did not have permits to possess the feathers. Id. The
McAllen Grace court stated that the only compelling interest is
protecting eagle populations. Id. at 473. The court dismissed the
compelling interest of only protecting federally recognized tribes,
because there is no justification for denying other American Indian
groups similar accommodations. Id. at 474.
The reasoning of the McAllen Grace court should be applied here,
because it also focused on the unjustifiable distinction between
state and federally recognized tribes. Although Mr. Redwing is
not a part of a federally recognized tribe, he is a part of the state
[Vol. XXVII: 167
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recognized Niobrara Band, which requires the use of eagle parts
for religious ceremonies. Thus, the government should not be
allowed to deny a religious exception to Mr. Redwing, a member
of a state recognized band, when it affords accommodations for
federally recognized tribes.
The McAllen Grace court, in reaching its conclusion, drew
comparisons to religious exceptions concerning bans on controlled
substances. McAllen Grace, 764 F.3d at 474. For example, the
court referenced the practice of a Christian spiritualist sect, which
in sincere adherence to their religion ingests hoasca. Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
425 (2005). Hoasca is a hallucinogen listed as a Schedule I
substance under the Controlled Substances Act. Id. at 423.
Although the use of hoasca is otherwise banned, the government
failed to show a compelling reason to ban its use for sacramental
purposes. Id. at 439. RFRA was enacted in response to a similar
case where practitioners of American Indian faith ingested peyote,
another hallucinogenic drug often used for religious purposes. Id.
at 424. The Gonzales Court reasoned that because the Controlled
Substances Act carved an exemption for peyote when used for
religious purposes, the Act should also create a similar exception
for hoasca. Id. at 433.
The same reasoning for extending the exception to the use
of controlled substances for religious purposes should be applied
to the possession of eagle parts. In Gonzales, this Court
highlighted that the government failed to show why a religious
exemption should be allowed for peyote but not hoasca. Here, the
government similarly failed to show why an exemption should
exist for federally recognized tribes, but not state recognized
bands. Further, when creating exemptions for peyote use, there
were no distinctions made between the practitioners of the
religions. Similar to peyote, worship of and use of bald eagle
feathers is a common feature across many American Indian
2017] 183
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groups, not just federally recognized ones. It is unclear, then, why
certain religious practices would be prohibited only to state
recognized American Indian groups when this distinction was not
made for peyote use.
Cases that have held that there is a compelling interest in
furthering relations with federally recognized tribes did so without
proper reasoning. Courts have resisted expansion of religious
exceptions to all American Indians generally. See United States v.
Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1277 (10th Cir. 2011). In United States v.
Wilgus, Samuel Ray Wilgus followed the American Indian faith,
but is not American Indian by birth, nor is he member of a state or
federally recognized tribe. Id. Wilgus was in possession of eagle
feathers without a permit. Id. The court held the religious
exception to possess eagle feathers under BGEPA should not be
extended to all adherents of American Indian religions because
doing so would overly expand the scope of the exception. Id. at
1277. As a policy matter, if any individual could claim religious
freedom when in possession of eagle parts, that would severely
undermine the effectiveness of trying to protect the eagle species.
The Wilgus Court held that there was a compelling interest in
protecting federally recognized tribes rather than making this
broad expansion, but did not consider the possibility of a smaller
expansion to state recognized tribes. Id. Here, however, Mr.
Redwing's Indian American heritage is not in dispute, and he is a
member of a state recognized band. Allowing Mr. Redwing to
possess eagle feathers for religious purposes would not undermine
the goal of the statutes to protect eagles, as it would if an exception
were created for all adherents of American Indian religions. The
only extension that should be made here is to state recognized
tribes, not to all practitioners of American Indian religions.
The distinction favoring federally recognized tribes should
not be observed today purely because it has been observed in the
past. Other courts have recognized that there is a compelling
[Vol. XXVII: 167
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interest in protected federally recognized tribes without providing
proper reasoning for doing so. See Gibson v. Babbit, 223 F.3d
1256,1258 (11th Cir. 2000); Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1277. But as
noted in the dissent to the lower court's opinion: "The restriction
of BGEPA's exception for 'the religious practice of Indian tribes'
to members of only federally recognized tribes does not stem from
the text of BGEPA itself, but . . . how the government chooses to
interpret BGEPA." The requirement that individuals seek permits,
and the demonstration that they are a part of a federally recognized
tribe, came over thirty years after Congress amended BGEPA.
McAllen Grace, 764 F.3d at 470, 474. These distinctions were
arbitrarily made in the regulations and should not be observed
without proper justification.
B. BGEPA and Its Regulations Are Not the Least
Restrictive Means of Accomplishing Either of the
Government's Proposed Compelling Interests.
In addition to establishing that BGEPA and its regulations
serve a compelling interest, the government must also show that
BGEPA and its regulations serve that interest by the least
restrictive means possible. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2). The test for
the least restrictive means to accomplish a compelling interest
follows a strict scrutiny standard and is "exceptionally
demanding." Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2780 (2014). To meet this standard, the government must
prove it accomplished one of its compelling interests by citing
specific evidence to support their assertion that no other less
restrictive means is viable. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430; see
also McAllen Grace, 764 F.3d at 476-80. Additionally, the least
restrictive means test does not consider the regulatory scheme in
the abstract, but rather "through application of the challenged law
'to the person' -- the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of
religion is being substantially burdened." Gonzales 546 U.S. at
430-31. The government has not met this high standard for the
2017] 185
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interest of protecting bald and golden eagle populations, nor for
the interest of furthering relationships with federally recognized
tribes.
i. BGEPA and its regulations are not the least
restrictive means of protecting bald and
golden eagle populations.
BGEPA and its regulations are not the least restrictive
means of protecting bald and golden eagle populations because the
government failed to consider all viable alternatives. In order to
satisfy its burden of showing that it employed the least restrictive
means, the government must perform an extensive analysis of
other possible means of accomplishing its interests. See Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-84. The government has not done so
here, but rather has refused to consider less restrictive alternatives
based on reasoning which this Court rejected in Hobby Lobby.
The government must consider all other possible means, even
those that would require the government to expend additional
resources or establish new methods of enforcement. Id. at 2781.
In Hobby Lobby, this Court held that United States
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") could provide
health insurance coverage for contraceptives to Hobby Lobby's
female employees by a less restrictive means than forcing Hobby
Lobby to provide coverage itself. Id. In its analysis, this Court
suggested that less restrictive means included HHS covering the
cost of the insurance to the employees. Id. This Court also
rejected the assertion that RFRA cannot require the creation of
new programs. Id. at 2780-81. Therefore, in the instant case, the
government must consider all possible means of accomplishing its
interest of protecting bald and golden eagle populations, even if
such means would necessitate additional funds or the creation of
new programs.
[Vol. XXVII: 167
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Here, applying the analysis required by Hobby Lobby
would reveal several other less restrictive means of protecting
eagle populations. The possibilities include additional permitting
to certify that the eagle parts were legally obtained and not the
result of illegal poaching or black market transactions. The
government may not refuse to consider these means simply
because these options may require additional enforcement efforts,
additional costs, or the creation of new permitting programs.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781. In order to reject these options
as a reasonable method of enforcement, the government would
have to show that they are impossible or financially unviable. See
id. at 2784. Here, the government has failed to meet its burden to
show that BGEPA and its regulations are the least restrictive
means of protecting eagle populations.
Furthermore, in instances where the government extends a
religious exception to a general ban to one religious group, but not
others, it has a burden to show why an expansion to the exception
would not be tenable. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 433. In fulfilling
this burden, the government cannot simply reference abstract
justifications, but rather must cite to specific evidence to justify
limiting religious exceptions. Id (this Court in Gonzales held that
general references to research on the dangers of Schedule I
substances was not sufficiently specific to justify denying a
religious exception for hoasca).
In order to show that the religious exception to only
federally recognized tribes in BGEPA and its regulations is the
least restrictive means, the government must cite to specific
evidence as to why an expansion of the exception to state
recognized tribes would not be viable. Following the logic of this
Court in Gonzales, reference to general information about danger
to eagle populations is not sufficient. The government has the
burden to prove that an exception that includes state recognized
tribes would prevent it from protecting eagle populations, but the
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government has failed to provide such specific evidence. Just as
the government in Gonzales failed to show specific additional
harm to the general population by allowing a religious exception
for hoasca use, the government here has failed to show that an
exception for state recognized tribes would prevent it from
protecting eagle populations.
Finally, courts have interpreted RFRA to require
consideration of the law as applied to the particular claimant
appearing before the court. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,
685 (7th Cir. 2013). This Court must consider the specific
religious practices of the claimant that have been burdened and
whether that burden is necessary to accomplish government
interests. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015). In Holt, this
Court upheld a prisoner's right to maintain a beard despite the
government's objections that beards could be used to hide
contraband. Id. at 867. This Court focused on the fact that the
prisoner requested to grow a 1/2-inch beard, and held that such a
beard could not possibly be used to smuggle contraband into
prisons and therefore did not inhibit the government's interest. Id.
at 863-64.
Here, this Court should consider whether Mr. Redwing's
possession of bald eagle feathers specifically impedes the
government's ability to protect eagle populations. When
considered as specifically applied to Mr. Redwing, BGEPA and its
regulations are not the least restrictive means of protecting eagle
populations. Mr. Redwing did not participate in any activities
BGEPA and its regulations are designed to prevent. He did not
hunt or poach the eagle in question, nor did he participate in illegal
sale or purchase of eagle parts. Therefore, application of BGEPA
and its regulations to Mr. Redwing is not the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the interest of protecting eagle
populations because doing so would not aid prevention of hunting,
poaching, or illegal sale or purchase of eagle parts.
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ii. BGEPA and its regulations are not the least
restrictive means of maintaining
relationships with federally recognized
tribes.
Even if this Court should find that there is a compelling
interest in protecting the ability of members of federally
recognized tribes to practice their religion, BGEPA and its
regulations are not the least restrictive means of accomplishing this
interest. The government has not shown how an increase in
waiting time for eagle parts by members of federally recognized
tribes eliminates its ability to pursue this interest. Nor has the
government shown that an increase in waiting time is adequate
justification to exclude an option from the least restrictive means
analysis, a strict scrutiny standard. Furthermore, the government
has not sufficiently shown that the inclusion of state recognized
tribes in its permitting scheme for legal acquisition of eagle parts
would result in a substantial increase in waiting time for eagle
parts from the repository.
The extensive analysis proscribed in Hobby Lobby must
also be applied in considering the least restrictive means of
fulfilling the government's responsibilities to federally recognized
tribes. See 134 S. Ct. at 2780-84. The government has also failed
to satisfy this demanding standard for this interest. Under the
Hobby Lobby analysis, increased wait times should not be a
justification for the government to disregard a less restrictive
means of accomplishing its interest. This Court in Hobby Lobby
rejected arguments that a new program for contraception coverage
should not be considered because it would force female employees
to take additional steps to access contraceptives. Id. at 2782. Just
as this Court in Hobby Lobby required HIHS to consider
alternatives which may inconvenience individual employees, here
USFWS must consider alternatives which may increase wait times
for members of federally recognized tribes.
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Prior to Hobby Lobby, cases such as Gibson and Wilgus
held that BGEPA and its regulations were the least restrictive
means of fulfilling obligations to federally recognized tribes. See
Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1258; Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1277. Neither of
these cases, however, undergoes the thorough analysis undertaken
in Hobby Lobby. Under the stricter standard proscribed by this
Court in Hobby Lobby, the reasoning used by the Gibson and
Wilgus courts would not pass muster because both courts
considered increased wait times to be sufficient justification to
exclude a less restrictive means. Because Hobby Lobby rejected
this type of justification, these cases would likely have been
decided differently on the issue of least restrictive means had they
occurred following Hobby Lobby.
Additionally, the government here makes a factual assertion
that the expansion of the religious use exceptions to members of
other American Indian groups would severely increase wait times
for members of federally recognized tribes to receive eagle parts.
The government does not, however, provide ample evidence to
support this assertion as required under RFRA. While this Court
should respect the opinions of experts in USFWS, this Court
should not simply defer to those opinions without sufficient
evidence. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864. Absent additional evidence,
this Court should not accept the assertion that the expansion of the
religious exception would significantly increase wait times.
Moreover, the government has not provided sufficient data
to prove the assertion that wait times will significantly increase
based on population estimates. According to 2010 census data,
there are approximately 5.2 million persons of American Indian or
Alaskan Native decent in the United States, of which
approximately 2 million belong to federally recognized tribes.
McAllen Grace, 764 F.3d at 478. Among the federally recognized
tribes are some of the largest tribes, such as the Cherokee, the
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Navajo, and the Sioux, each with membership in the hundreds of
thousands. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ACS Demographic
and Housing Estimates,
https://factfmder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/j sf/pages/productv
iew.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YRDPO5&src=pt (last visited Jan. 8,
2017). By contrast, only a small number of states recognize tribes
separately from the federal recognition system. Alexa Koenig,
Federalism and the State Recognition of Native American Tribes:
A Survey of State-Recognized Tribes and States Recognition
Processes Across the United States, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 79
(2008). Therefore, this Court has reason to doubt whether the
evidence would bear out the government's assertion that an
expansion of permitting to include state recognized tribes would
have a significant impact on wait times for eagle parts. Based on
this lack of evidence and its failure to support the government's
assertion, this Court should find that a limitation of a religious
exception to only members of federally recognized tribes is not the
least restrictive means of fulfilling obligations to those tribes.
II. NAGPRA PROTECTS THE REMOVAL OF SACRED
OBJECTS, WHICH INCLUDES REMOVAL OF BALD
EAGLE FEATHERS USED FOR CEREMONIAL
PURPOSES, FROM AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS.
NAGPRA grants ownership rights to American Indians
when certain objects are discovered on American Indian land. 25
U.S.C.A. § 3002 (1990). According to its statutory language,
"[t]he ownership or control of Native American Cultural items
which are excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands after
November 16, 1990 . . . shall be in the Indian tribe . . . on whose
tribal lands such objects or remains were discovered." Id. The
statute covers unassociated funerary objects, objects of cultural
patrimony, and sacred objects. Id. NAGPRA defines "sacred
object" as "specific ceremonial objects which are needed by
traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice of
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traditional Native American religions by their present day
adherents." 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001 (1990). NAGPRA's statutory
language, however, is silent as to what constitutes a specific
ceremonial object.
The lower court noted that animals constitute "goods" and
that any unit of goods is fungible. By that reasoning, the lower
court concluded that dead bald eagle feathers are fungible goods,
and fungible goods cannot be specific under § 3001's definition of
"sacred objects." While Mr. Redwing does not contest the
assertion that dead bald eagles likely constitute fungible goods, the
lower court erred by declaring that fungible goods such as bald
eagle feathers are categorically excluded from § 3001's definition
of "sacred objects." Thus, the feathers confiscated from Mr.
Redwing were protected under NAGPRA as sacred objects.
A. A Strict Textualist Interpretation of the Word
"Specific" Under § 3001 Does Not Resolve
Ambiguity.
Courts are "the final authorities on issues of statutory
construction." Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin,
903 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 1989). To interpret the meaning of
"specific ceremonial objects" under NAGPRA, this Court should
begin with the language of the statute. See Barnhart v. Sigmon
Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002); See also Kingdomware
Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 136 U.S. 1969, 1977 (2016).
While a textualist interpretation is often an effective canon of
statutory interpretation, courts may not be able to resolve
ambiguity caused by multiple competing definitions using this
method alone. Here, a textualist approach cannot resolve the
ambiguity in § 3001 because there are multiple valid
interpretations of the word "specific."
The lower court erred by relying simply on the dictionary
meaning of the word "specific" as excluding fungible goods.
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Based on this dictionary definition, the lower court erroneously
reasoned that for an item to be specific, it must be unique or
irreplaceable. While this construction may be one valid
interpretation, Merriam-Webster's Dictionary provides a
competing definition of the word "specific." Merriam-Webster
also defines specific as "free from ambiguity." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/specific (last visited on Jan. 13, 2017).
Ultimately, this distinction is important because it will control
whether this Court considers fungible goods to be specific. To
provide an illustration, one can hold a specific blank sheet of
paper, even though blank paper is fungible. Despite the fact that
the sheets of paper are indistinguishable from one another, each
has a unique physical existence. Therefore, the lower court's
reliance on a single dictionary definition of the word "specific"
was improper. In order to properly interpret the word "specific,"
this Court should turn to extra-textual evidence to resolve the
ambiguity.
B. Legislative History Demonstrates that Congress
Intended "Sacred Objects" to Include Fungible
Goods such as Bald Eagle Feathers.
This Court has held that "where resolution of a question of
federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we
look first to the statutory language, and then to the legislative
history if the statutory language is unclear." Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 896 (1984); see also In re New Investments, Inc., 840
F.3d 1137, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[i]f the statutory text is
ambiguous, we employ other tools such as legislative history to
construe the meaning of the ambiguous terms.") In Blum, the
parties disputed differing interpretations of the phrase "reasonable
attorney's fees" under a federal statute. 465 U.S. at 888. The
Court in Blum referred to the statute's Senate report as a
benchmark to interpret "reasonable attorney's fees." Id. at 897.
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As such, this Court should turn to NAGPRA's legislative history
to properly interpret the term "specific ceremonial object."
NAGPRA's congressional record provides clarity on Congress'
intent regarding the general purposes of the statute as well as the
scope of sacred objects. Congress explicitly left out key language
that would create a requirement for sacred objects to be unique or
irreplaceable.
i. The congressional record shows that
Congress purposefully left out the word
"irreplaceable" from NAGPRA's definition
of sacred object.
NAGPRA's congressional record reveals that Congress
excluded the word "irreplaceable" in the definition of "cultural
objects" due to American Indian objections. 136 Cong. Rec.
H10985-01 (1990). This concern was raised by the Antique Tribal
Art Dealers Association ("ATADA"), which argued the definition
of "sacred object" was so broad as to be unworkable. Id. ATADA
suggested that the definition should stipulate that the object need
be "irreplaceable" and "necessary for the continued practice of
tribal religions." Id. ATADA's suggestions, however, were not
implemented. Id. The congressional record noted that a sacred
object need not be irreplaceable. Id. By doing so, Congress
sustained American Indians' objections that courts should not
determine what is intrinsically necessary for practice of a religion.
Id. If Congress had included the word "irreplaceable," then
fungible goods would not constitute sacred objects because
fungible goods are by their nature replaceable. Thus, by its
omission of the word "irreplaceable," Congress intended not to
exclude fungible goods. Therefore, bald eagle feathers should not
be categorically excluded from NAGPRA's protections simply
because they are fungible.
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ii. This Court should construe bald eagle
feathers as "sacred objects" because the
overall goal of NAGPRA is rooted in
protecting American Indian rights and
traditions.
According to this Court, American Indian law must be read
"in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of
those who drafted them." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 1011, 1020 (1978). Here, the congressional record
reveals that NAGPRA is "necessary to ensure the repatriation of
hundreds of sacred objects to Native American communities to
reverse several hundreds of years of abuses of a people, their lands
and their very roots." 136 Cong. Rec. H10985-01 (1990). Further,
NAGPRA is aimed at building pride among American Indians and
understanding among other ethnic groups. Id. Congress narrowed
the scope of what constitutes a sacred object; stating it does not
include "every basket, every pot and every blanket ever made by
Indian hands." Id. While drawing this limitation, Congress
intended to afford American Indians with proper treatment in
regards to human remains and religious items.
Congress, in drafting NAGPRA, seemed to suggest that
there are two categories of American Indian objects: one of
cultural or religious significance, and one of common goods such
as pottery and baskets. Bald eagle feathers have deep cultural and
religious significance to American Indians. See United States v.
Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) ("[t]he golden eagle is important in
enabling many Indian tribes ... to continue ancient customs that
are of deep religious or emotional significance to them.") Thus,
given the choice between these two categories, eagle feathers
certainly fall into the first category because these feathers are
much more like other ceremonial objects than common household
goods. Therefore, Congress likely intended to protect objects such
as eagle feathers under NAGPRA.
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C. The Supreme Court Has Held Numerous Times
that when Faced with Two Possible Constructions
of a Statute, the Statute Must Be Liberally
Construed in Favor of American Indians.
Even if this Court disagrees that the congressional record
resolves § 3001's ambiguity, a well-rooted principle should guide
this Court. This Court has articulated that when presented with
two possible constructions of a statute concerning American
Indian relations, the statute must be liberally construed in favor of
the American Indians. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S.
679, 687 (1993); Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold
Reservation v. WoldEng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 149 (1984); Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985); Alaska Pacific
Fisheries v. U.S., 248 U.S. 78, 79 (1918).
In Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Nation, The County of Yakima, Washington sought to impose an
ad valorem tax on land located within the gibson Indian
Reservation. 502 U.S. 251, 253 (1992). This Court grappled with
the issue of whether "taxation of land" should include the taxation
of proceeds from the sale of the land. Id. at 268. Justice Scalia,
delivering the opinion for the majority, held that when "faced with
these two possible constructions, our choice between them must be
dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court's Indian
jurisprudence." Id. at 269. This Court thus reinforced the long-
standing principle that "statutes are to be construed liberally in
favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit." Id.
In an earlier decision, this Court cemented the principle of
interpretation to the benefit of American Indians. See Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 422 U.S. 653, 666 (1973). The petitioners,
Omaha Indian Tribe, argued that the word "Indians" is to include
an American Indian Tribe. Id. at 654. Respondents, on the other
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hand, argued that Congress intended to differentiate American
Indian Tribes from individual American Indians. Id. at 665. This
Court held in favor of the Omaha Tribe, stating "statutes passed
for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally
construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the
Indians." Id. at 654, 666.
In Bryant v. Itasca County, this Court dealt with two
possible interpretations of whether a statute granted states the
authority to impose taxes on American Indians who live on
reservations. 426 U.S. 373, 373 (1976). This Court considered the
statute in question, Public Law 280, to be "admittedly ambiguous."
Id. at 392. This Court held in favor of Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,
restating the "eminently sound and vital canon" that laws should
be liberally construed in favor of American Indians. Id.
This Court is faced with two possible interpretations of
NAGPRA, a statute that Congress undoubtedly passed for the
benefit of Indian tribes. Here, the phrase "specific ceremonial
objects" is similarly ambiguous to other statutes this Court has
interpreted to the benefit of American Indians. This Court should
continue to observe this principle given this country's historical
and recent mistreatment of American Indians. Given the
challenged state of American Indian religion and way of life, this
Court should consider such measures that allow American Indian
cultures to flourish instead of depriving them of their religious and
cultural rights. Therefore, this Court should preserve the
"eminently sound and vital cannon" that laws such as the
NAGPRA should be liberally construed in favor of American
Indians.
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CONCLUSION
USFWS substantially burdened Mr. Redwing's religious
freedom based on a faulty interpretation of BGEPA. The
government has failed to show a compelling reason that would
justify burdening Mr. Redwing's free exercise of religion but not a
similarly situated groups. The government has also not employed
the least restrictive means of protecting eagle populations because
extending the religious exception to state recognized American
Indian groups would not harm eagle populations. Furthermore, the
government has also not employed the least restrictive means of
engendering relations with federally recognized tribes because
increased wait times are not a sufficient justification to limit the
least restrictive means analysis.
Additionally, NAGPRA should govern this case. This
Court should examine legislative history because there are two
competing dictionary definitions of the word "specific."
NAPGRA's congressional record highlights that Congress
intentionally excluded the word "irreplaceable" from the definition
of "specific ceremonial object." Furthermore, this Court
established a principle of statutory interpretation that American
Indian laws should be construed liberally in favor of the American
Indians in cases such as this where there are competing
interpretations. Accordingly, this Court should REVERSE the
lower court's decision.
Date: January 17, 2017
Respectfully Submitted,
Holden Benon, Nicholas Keats,
Andrea Swanson, Counsel for Michael Redwing
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